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WHERE  ARE  US/EC  RELATIONS  HEADED  ? 
'Ihe EC  View 
I  find it sarewhat ironic that as a  European I  should have been 
asked to speak to you about relations between the European Connruni ty 
and the United States here alnost on the soores of the Pacific e>cean. 
Ironic not only because of what appears to zre  at least to be a  trans-
fer in the basis of influence and I_X)V.1er  fran the North East to the 
South and West and with it a  certain refocussing of overseas interest 
and attention and even a  sense of irritation with Europe,  but also 
because of a  pronounced drift in us  trade policies, with the Pacific 
Basin becoming increasingly nore irrp::>rtant  for US  foreign trade than 
the Atlantic - an iiiFOrtance which has long existed for the No.  West 
Brain Trade. 
_  .. _; 
Nevertheless,  in spite of these significant develo:prents,  the us 
and EC  re:rrain the 2  leading actors on the world agricultural stage. 
And,  it is on this aspect of our relationship that I  propose to concen-
trate ley'  remarks this rrorning. 
Before looking at what could be  ahead,  I  think it might be useful 
to plot where we  have got to and by what route. 
Both the US  and EC  have sorre remarkable similarities  :  we  both 
have highly developed economies and we  both belong to broadly the sane 
tenperate climatic zone.  We  thus have many  products camon to both. 
But the US  climatic zone is wider than that of the EC,  so that a  broader 
range of products is possible here (for instance,  soyabeans and cotton) • 
.  / ... 'lhere are,  however,  sare other important differences.  We  have a 
', 
'  •  '  I 
somewhat larger J;Opulation  :  about 270· million caripared with 230 million 
here.  'Ihere is the inp:>rtant difference of geographical size  •.  I):)  you realise 
that if I  had travelled fran my old office in Brussels the sane distance 
that I  flav yesterday between Washington and Portland,  I  would be way beyond 
MJscaw,  the other side of the Ural MJuntains - or, perhaps,  floating on my 
ma.gic  carpet sorrewhere above Baghdad  ! 
Contrasts between your fann structures and outlets and ours have led to dif-
ferent mixes of fann products.  Your  farrrs  average 160 ha.  and ours 16 ha,, 
. _we  have tended to place agreater emphasis on livestock and livestock 
products;  the US  on grain and oilseeds.  One  result of this has been that 
EC  livestock production has provided a  very attractive e:xp:>rt ma.rket  for US 
2. 
feed products,  such as soya,  of which we  took 11.5 mio  tons in 1982  and 10 mio 
tons in fiscal 1983.  'Ibis represents so:rrething like 48%  of all your soyabean 
;.and :rreal exPc>rts  and is worth around 3.  5  bio $. 
Just to give you a  rough idea of this difference in product mix  :  livestock 
and livestock products represent 56%  of farm production in the EC  and about 
. 
48%  in the US,  whilst crops represent 52%  in the us  and  44%  in the EC  [of which 
grains + oilseeds:  31%  US  ;  13%  EC] • 
But whilst structures and crop mixes exhibit sare differences,  on both 
sides of the Atlantic we have agricultural policies which are strikingly 
similar in their aims but with sorrewhat different ma.chinery.  'lhe aims of 
the Comron  Agricultural Policy  (CAP)  are clearly laid out in Article 39  of 
our founding Constitution 
the Treaty of Rom:¥and are: - increase agricultural productivity  (through 
teclmical progress, etc. ) ; 
- ensure  fair standard of living for far:rrers; 
- stabilise markets  (i.e.  iron out violent 
fluctuations in supply and in prices); 
- assure sufficient food; 
- ensure food supplies at reasonable prices; 
not very different from US  aims.  And,  furthenrore,  we  have policies which 
have had similar results for us both, with increases in both productivity 
and production that have resulted in quanti  ties beyond those which the -------- ·-··-·······---··-· 
3. 
market can absorb. 
Wheat production in the US,  for instance,  in the decade pre PIK, 
had increased by 72%  and rrost of that in soft wheat - or nore than 2  1/2 
tines average world growth - thus making your farrrers critically de:pendent 
on an tmreliable world market. 
At the sane tine, in the EC,  our COnnon Agricultural Policy - the 
victim of its own  success -has led to increased productivity and has 
reduced our de:pendence on imports for the supply of sene agricultural 
products and,  in other cases,  transforrred the Cornmmity into a  net exporter. 
However,  in spite of achieving self sufficiency in a  number of irrq;x)rtant 
farm products,  the EC  renains by far the world's leading lirp:>rter of agri-
cultural and food products whilst the US  renains the world's leading 
~rter. 
But it is, of course,  on these very \~rld export markets for agriculture 
where the rrost serious oonflicts between the US  and the EC  have arisen and 
where trade relations have sometimes been fraught with difficulties. 
let ne review briefly some of the major developrents in the field of 
US/EC  agricultural trade so as to set the present situation against sone 
sort of back drop. 
In the early 1960's, the introduction by the Cam:nunity of the Connon 
Customs  Tariff - one of the provisions along with the CAP  of the Treaty 
of Rorre  - and of the first Connon  Market organisations for some  crops, 
seened to the US  to pose a  threat to Arrerican sales to Europe. 
./  ... 'lb offset the rreasures just adopted,  the EC  agreed to bind at nil 
the Customs duties on sorre  imports and to start negotiations on the 
completion of the CAP.  Nevertheless,  a  fall in US  exports of chicken 
sparked off reprisals in 1963 against our exports to the US. 
Subsequently,  a  marked improverrent in the us  agricultural trade 
balance with Europe helped to relieve Arrerican pressure as the value 
of our imports of US  products gathered rrorrentum to achieve alxmt 22% 
of all Arrerican agricultural exports. 
But this,apparently,was insufficient and in 1971,  further improve-
rrents in access were demanded by the US  and with the start of the 'lbkyo 
Round  in 1973 pressure intensified.  In 1976,  16 corrplaints were filed 
by the US  against the EC  in the GA.'IT  and in place of the chicken war, 
-we  were treated to a  turkey war. 
In spite of all,"  peace broke out!' in 1979 - as peace does - with 
the help of mutual  and balanced concessions and at the sarre tirre,  the 
machinecy of the Cormon  Agricultural Policy was  acknc:Mledged as being 
in line with GA'IT  rules on international trade. 
Since then,  there have been other important developrrents. 
I  hope you will excuse this potted history - which might incidentally 
have some  interest for the publishers - or indeed the readers - of 
the Readers'Digest, woo  seem to prefer condensed versicns .But,  the EC 
maintained its 22%  share of US  farm exports.  And  what is  rrore,  22% 
of a  considerably enhanced total - a  total of around 7 or 8 bio $  in 
1971 which had swollen to 41  bio $ in 1980. 
·I  ... 
4. But whilst the EC  has IPaintamed .its pre-eminent position as the 
biggest overseas IParket for us  fann products, it has becare a  net 
exporter of sorre  and the US,  whilst vigorously defending all the 
concessions obtamed from the Comm.m.i ty, now criticises corrpeti  tion 
fran the EC  on "WOrld  IParkets and,  in particular, attacks EC  exr:ort 
reftmds.  It is perhaps "WOrth  stressing a  nl.li'CUJer  of points at this 
jtmcture - that a  range of export aids are also deployed  by the 
United States by way of export credits,  [I heard Secretary Block 
boasting only last week that this klrninistration had spent nore on 
credit for agricultural eJq?Orts in the last 3  years than previous 
administrations had over the last 20  years]  PL  480  and the like -
that the EC's ex};X>rt  refund rrechanism was endorsed as  I  have just 
said in 1979 as bemg in line with CA'IT  rules; 
~- 'lhat even· though EC  exports of some  fann products have  grown - they 
have done so much less rapidly than those of the United States. 
Between 1961 and 1981,  the value of EC  fann exp::>rts rose by 27 bio $ 
and of US  exports by 38  bio $; 
- And,  finally, whilst this developrrent in our exports was  taking 
place,  our agricultural im!;orts were climbing steeply and our agri-
cultural trade deficit with the us  doubled beb.veen  1973 and 1981. and 
today stands at about 5  bio $. 
But,  to return to our brisk trot through past events.  In 19 81, 
the US  filed a  further batch of complaints with the CA'IT  against the 
EC  - on wheat flour,  poultry neat and sugar. 
And,  following US  disappointnent with the results of the GA'IT 
Ministerial Comnittee in November  1982  - despite an agreed prograrrrre of 
./  ... 
5. v.ork on trade in agriculture - pressure noun  ted here for a  nore ag-
gressive export policy.  But  at the end of that year,  following a 
nost valuable neeting in Brussels between President Thorn of the 
Comnission and Secretary Shultz, it  was  agreed to hold exploratory 
talks to try to find an arrangerrent compatible with existing systems. 
A useful series of rreetings  took place in 1983 between senior 
officials.  As  a  result,  a  procedure for exchanging infonnation was 
introduced ai.rred at avoiding misunderstanding and giving both sides 
early warning of possible problems and an infonnal v.orking party was 
set up to look at clarifying GA'IT  rules. 
Regrettably, despite these intensive contacts,  the US  announced 
in January 1983 the notorious subsidised flour deal with Egypt for 
of flour 
~1 rnio t;at belOW'  narket price levels and then again in August,  the 
US  concluded another contract with Egypt.  'Ihis t.:irre  for the sale of 
of butter 
18,000 tjand 10,000 t  of cheese at prices subsidised to a  level not 
only below narket rates but under the minimum fixed in the International 
Dairy Arrangerrent. 
But to end this very brief resume on a  nore positive note. 
In the wine sector  :  - first,  the Administration declined to support 
.  .  .
11 
.  Particulcu;l  v 
the W1ne  Equity Bl  so eagerly subscribed to not only;by produCers 
and their friends in the next State South from here, but also by a 
considerable nurriber of Congressnen; 
- second,  the I'IC  found that irrports of ordinary 
table wine were not injuring the US  wine industry;  and 
./  ... 
6. - third,  there has been an exchange of letters on 
wine making practices and as a  result of this and steps taken recently 
in Brussels,  US/EC  trade in wine should be facilitated. 
As to where our relationship is headed -whilst a  look at the past 
helps set us in a  historical perspective - I  do not think it is a  very 
useful guide as to what might happen in the future since the sane condi-
tions are rarely repeated.  Neither does an election year provide a  very 
solid base fran which to la'liD.ch  a  projection. 
But, whatever happens - perhaps a  greater proportion of the world's  food 
needs  grown in developing co'liD.tries  (at present,  a  relatively rich 2%  of 
the world's farrrers produce 25%  of ·the world's  food) ; 
perhaps a  (probable) 
-/further development of super cows; 
perhaps a  in the US 
-/greater concentration here/than in the past,on 
soft wheat 
- I  don't know and in any case  from ti.ne to ti.ne, 
we  are given a  healthy reminder by the weather that all is not decided 
in Brussels or Washington  [much will depend on the relative strength of 
the dollar and the extent to which developing cormtries'  economies can 
be stimulated] - but, we  shall need to keep in mind a  number of irrportant 
facts.  That  : 
- The  US  and EC  are both the largest economic 'liDits operating 
and the two leading contenders on ~r  ld agricultural markets acco'liDting 
. together for about one third of ~rld trade and nearly 30%  of world 
agricultural exfX)rts. 
./  ... 
7. 8. 
- The  EC  is the world 
1 s  leading exp:>rter of poultry neat and  usually of 
milk products  (I notice incidentally that the US  is starting  to nake 
disturbing incursions here and not just in Egypt.  I  trust that this is 
not a  new trend since it will aggravate a  very precarious situation on 
the world dairy market) • 
- 'Ihe EC  is the world 
1 s  leading importer of agricultural products 
and the US  famers 
1  best custorrer taking 7.  6  bio $ worth of us  fann produce 
in 1983 - Japan 5.9 bio $  - South America 4.9 bio $. 
- 'Ihat the US  is the world 
1 s  leading agricultural exp:>rter supplying 
arout 55%  of the coarse grains,  50%  of the soya,  45%  of the wheat,  30%  of 
the cotton and 25%  of the rice that rrove  in world trade. 
- 'Ihe rrore nurrerous that agricultural exp:>rters becone on world 
markets the greater the need for internal discipline. 
- No  one has a  god given right to dominate world markets at will 
at the expense of other partners who  nay have different nethods of 
subsidisation. 
What  I  am  trying to say is that both parties have everything to gain 
from the ha.rnonious working of world trade and that we  must both fully 
take account of the fact that we  live in a  highly interdependent world 
trading system and should seize the opportunity to cooperate and to solve 
our problems together. 
./  ... "'·-··-----------------------
It will not be easy,  faced as we  will continue to be with the 
difficult problens of selling agricultural products at corrrcercial prices 
for sane time.  '!here are, however,  some hopeful indications  : 
- there has been a  reasonably r:ositive start - to the work of the GA'IT 
Agriculture Corrmi ttee, but here it  would be helpful to end the one-
sided canpaign against the EC  and its export refundS and to recognize 
that every agricultural exporting nation supports its farrrers with the 
result that exports are assisted directly or indirectly  ; 
- and roth EC  and US  now  seem to be noving along similar tracks - that 
of controlling fann ~nditure. 
In the EC' s  case,  this latter developrrent is nowhere nore evident 
than in the decisions taken recently on the adaptation of the CAP  and 
on farm prices for the next marketing year.  After 3 years of persistent 
effort by the Comnission,  the Council of Ministers, under French presi-
dency,  accepted three r:oints of ma.jor  importance! 
- First,  the principle that agricultural guarantees can no longer 
be unlimited in nature. 
- Second, effective control of milk production by rreans of strict 
quotas with harsh penalties if exceeded;  and 
- 'Ihird,  a  tough price rx>licy,  including - for the first tirre -
price cuts for several products in several countries. 
As  for cereals in particular : 
- guarantee thresholds will be maintained - which rreans that if a  pre-
detennined production total is exceeded,  fanrers will not get the sane 
guarantee for their products; 
./  ... 
9. - in addition,  guaranteed prices for grain 1984/85 will be reduced by 
1%  as canpared with this year - as indeed they will be oilseeds and 
wine. 
But this does not oamplete the exercise and hard decisions will be 
required in the future.  OUr milk producers bore the brunt of the attack 
this year,  since it is here that the irrbalance between supply and derrand 
is nost serious and our grain producers got off fairly lightly this tirre 
round.  It will be their tum next. 
As  for other prosp:cts for cereals, we  reckon that on the basis of 
recent trends - a  stable acreage but improved yields - our normal level 
of production by 1990  could be in the order of 137  rnio  t  compared with 
just under 119 rnio  t  this year. 
We  also reckon that the off-take within the Corrrm.mity  for hurran  and 
industrial use and for seed seems likely to stay about 40  rnio t.  'Ihat 
rreans  internal demand will depend on use for animal feed. 
If the extra derrand which we  expect by 1990  for feed for pigs and 
poultry is all taken up by Com:mmity cereals - and that is a  big "if", 
because it supposes no increase in the use of cereals substitutes - then 
we  calculate that the use of cereals for feed could go up by 5  mio t. 
So it is clear that, on present trends,  the quanti  ties available for 
export by the Com:mmity  on the world market will increase. 
A large part of demand on the 'vorld :market depends on countries 
such as China and the Soviet Union,  wmse derrand is consistently un-
predictable.  But my  guess - not particularly original - is that the 
world market for cereals in the second half of the eighties will 
./  ... 
10. increase less rapidly than in the seventies.  So although the Commmi ty 
should rraintain its share of the world rrarket, it  would be unwise to 
expect a  rrajor expansion in volurre.  'Ihat is why  the Conmission has to 
be extrenely prudent as regards the guarantee threshold for cereals and 
will be focusing more  attention on cereals prices in next years price 
decisions following the 1%  cut this year. 
But - I  hear you ask - did not this package of rreasures also include 
decisions on com gluten feed which could sour the EC/US  relationships ? 
I  do not accept that our proposals in this area need lead to any breaking 
of china.  I  say this, because  : 
- First,  the  Community  is making  use  of its rights 
under Article  28  of  the  GATT  which  allows  renegotiation 
~f concessions  subject to certain conditions of  compensation. 
- Second,  the  Community  is not  taking  immediate, 
unilateral action to prohibit or  reduce  the  iraports  of corn 
gluten  feed  and  other corn based by-products,  but is pro-
posing that negotiations  should  be  opened with  a  view  to 
stabilising them. 
- Third,  it is proposing that such stabilisation 
should be  achieved  through  a  temporary  and partial sus-
pension of existing concessions,  by  the  establishment of 
annual tariff and  levy  free  quotas  and with appropriate 
compensation. 
./  ... 
11. - Fourth,  moves  in the  grain  substitutes area  are 
not  aimed  specifically or exclusively against corn  gluten 
feed or against the  United States.  Arrangements  have  al-
ready been  concluded  and  are  in place  as  regards other 
important substitutes  such  as  manioc  and  brans  from  S.E. 
Asia  and  elsewhere. 
- Fifth and last,  the  measure  has  to be  seen  in the 
general  framework  of the  far  reaching decisions  to reform 
the  CAP  which will result in major sacrifices  by  our  farmers 
through  :  - drastic limitations on  financial  support; 
- cutting back  on  milk  and other surplus production 
(which  should  reduce  demand  for  cgf  and  other 
substitutes); 
bringing our grain prices closer to  those of our 
competitors'  - an effort we  do  not wish  to see 
undermined  by  increasing imports  of substitutes. 
'lhese refonn :measures  represent an irrq;:ortant contribution towards a 
better balance of supply and dell'and  on world markets which should be 
of benefit to all farrrers in all trading nations and should thus help 
to srrooth relationships.  So,  don't let us  overdramatise what is hap-
pening in the field of grain substitutes. 
'!his considerable package of decisions taken in Brussels on 
31  March  1984  were not taken prinarily for budgetary reasons, but 
to fit our Connon  Agricultural Policy and our fanning to :meet  the 
changed economic  circumstances of the mid 1980's and beyond. 





It will not lead to a  dismantling of the 
CAP  nor to the disappearance of European fann products from world markets. 
v.e  are not going to fold our tents and silently steal away.- You  can instead expect 
to see a  leaner, nore streamlined European agriculture. 
There is, therefore, all the nore reason for us to seek cooperation 
rather than conflict. 
The  EC, whilst vigilantly defending its own  interests but conplying with 
and 
its international obligations, is/ will be prepared - as it has been 
in the past - to search diligently with the US  and others for ways of 
to 
cooperating so as to pronote world trade andjcl.void sterile bickering. 
But for this, we  shall need considerable r:oli  tical will.  Let us all de-
nonstrate this will to achieve rules of conduct for agricultural trade 
which will benefit us all. 
* * * * 